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NOTES
The Serpentine Wall of Separation Between Church and
State: Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia
In 1802, in a now-famous letter to the Danbury Baptist As-
sociation, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall
of separation between Church and State."' However clear it was to
Jefferson that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to erect
such a "wall of separation," that clarity is lacking in modem-day
Establishment Clause doctrine.2 Grounded on "catchy phrases,"
"neat tests," and what many critics brand as inaccurate historical
analysis, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been labeled a
"jurisprudence of chance."3 Perhaps Justice Jackson foresaw this
1. SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943) (quoting letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802). In this letter,
Jefferson referred to the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
3. Jay A. Sekulow et al., Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality
as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
351, 354-55 (1995). The authors add that "the Court's religious freedom cases are often
logically incomprehensible, its First Amendment jurisprudence irreconcilable from one case
to the next. The reasoning suffers from a lack of intelligible consistency and constitutional
congruency." Id. at 353; see also Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice From Lemon:
Towards a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621,630 (1995)
(noting that "the Court has not been able to enunciate any consistent test... leav[ing]
lower courts, local governments and school boards with little guidance on how to interpret
the Establishment Clause in future cases"); Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. Cmn. L. REv. 115, 115 (1992) (quoting Professor Leonard Levy, from
whom Professor McConnell stands ideologically at "a pole opposite," as stating that " 'a
strict separationist and a zealous accommodationist are likely to agree that the Supreme
Court would not recognize an establishment of religion if it took life and bit the
Justices.' "); M.G. "Pat" Robertson, Squeezing Religion Out of the Public Square-The
Supreme Court, Lemon, and the Myth of the Secular Society, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 223, 223 (1995) (noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence "has accomplished the
amazing feat of drawing criticism from 'people who disagree about nearly everything else
in the law' ") (quoting Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular". Reconstructing the
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phenomenon when he warned the Court more than four decades ago
that great care must be taken in Establishment Clause cases lest the
Court "make the legal 'wall of separation between church and state'
as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson
for the University he founded."4
Ironically, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia5 recently had the opportunity to
review an Establishment Clause challenge to the procedure for
distributing student fees at the university Mr. Jefferson founded. This
Note examines Rosenberger and the Court's modern First
Amendment doctrine. After briefly discussing the facts and the lower
courts' dispositions of Rosenberger,6 this Note delineates the
majority's opinion, which held that the University unconstitutionally
denied a group of undergraduate students their rights to freedom of
expression.7 Next, the Note addresses the arguments of the dissent
that this denial was necessary to avoid a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause This Note examines relevant topics within the
confusing and unclear area of Establishment Clause doctrine to
determine whether the Court's decision in Rosenberger was consistent
with past Establishment Clause cases. This Note then focuses on the
second aspect of the First Amendment implicated by Rosen-
berger-freedom of speech-and the Court's past decisions in this
realm that have created a doctrine condemned by many as dependent
upon a "myopic focus on formalistic labels."'" Finally, this Note
addresses the significance of the Rosenberger decision by discussing
the future of student fee programs in the university setting."
At issue in Rosenberger was whether the University of Virginia
was constitutionally required to subsidize a Christian magazine using
fees it had collected as part of a program created "to support a broad
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 956 (1989)).
4. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
6. See infra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text. The opinion of the Rosenberger
Court was delivered by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Thomas wrote separate
concurring opinions. Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens,
Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2510.
8. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 83-152 and accompanying text.
10. Geoffrey Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. Cmi. L. REv. 46,93 (1987); see
infra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176-225 and accompanying text.
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range of extracurricular student activities that 'are related to the
educational purpose of the University.' "2 Each semester, full-time
students at the University were charged a mandatory student fee of
fourteen dollars, which went into a Student Activities Fund (SAF).3
Organizations at the University that had acquired the status of a
Contracted Independent Organization (CIO) could apply to the fund
for payment of bills from outside contractors.'4 An organization
obtained CIO status if the majority of its members were students, its
managing officers were full-time students, and it complied with certain
procedural requirements such as taking a pledge not to discriminate
in admitting members. 5 The administration of the fund was legally
controlled by the University, which delegated authority to allocate
SAF funds to the Student Council, a body of elected students.1
6
Whether a CIO could apply to the Student Council for funding was
governed by several factors outlined in the Guidelines established by
the University.' For example, the Guidelines made eligible for SAF
funds any "student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups."" Excluded from eligibility
for student funds were religious activities, political groups, sororities,
fraternities, honor societies, and organizations whose membership was
exclusionary'" Religious activities were defined by the Guidelines
as any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."'2 The Guidelines
required that funds be distributed based on the following criteria:
12. Application to Petition for Certiorari at 61a, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329)).
13. Id. at 2514.
14. Id.
15. I&
16. Id
17. Application to Petition for Certiorari at 61a-67a, Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329).
18. Rosenberger, 115 S: Ct. at 2514. In the 1990-91 academic year, 343 student groups
qualified as CIOs, of which 135 applied for support from the SAF. Of those 135 groups,
118 received funding. Fifteen of those groups were funded as " 'student news,
information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups.' ". Id. at
2515. Among the funded organizations were groups such as "the Gandhi Peace Center,
the Federalist Society, Students for Animal Rights, the Lesbian and Gay Student Union,
and the Student Alliance for Virginia's Environment." Brief of Petitioner at 4,
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-
329). The Jewish Law Students Association and the Muslim Students Association also
received student fees. The University stated that both organizations had cultural, instead
of religious, purposes. Id at 5-7.
19. Brief of Petitioner at 3-4, Rosenberger (No. 94-329).
20. Application to Petition for Certiorari at 66a, Rosenberger (No. 94-329).
1996] 1227
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"the size of the group, its financial self-sufficiency, and the University-
wide benefit of its activities.",21
The petitioner, Ronald Rosenberger, was an undergraduate
student at the University when he formed Wide Awake Productions
(WAP) " 'to publish a magazine of philosophical and religious
expression,' '[t]o facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints' and '[t]o provide
a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.' 22 The
organization's magazine, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the
University of Virginia, addressed issues such as racism, crisis pregnan-
cy, homosexuality, and eating disorders from a "Christian perspec-
tive."' , The editors of WAP stated the purpose of the magazine as
twofold: "to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according
to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what
a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means."'24
Despite its religious purpose, WAP was given CIO status soon
after it was organized by Rosenberger.' A few months later WAP
applied for funds from the SAF to pay for the printing costs of Wide
Awake.2 6  The Student Council Appropriations Committee denied
WAP's request for funding because of its conclusion that publishing
Wide Awake was a "religious activity" within the meaning of the
Guidelines.27 WAP unsuccessfully appealed this finding to the full
Student Council and then to the University administration's Student
21. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
22. Application to Petition for Certiorari at 67, Rosenberger (No. 94-329).
23. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
24. Id. The conclusion of each article in the magazine was marked by a cross. IaL
The advertisers in the magazine consisted largely of churches, centers for Christian study,
and Christian bookstores. Id.
25. Id. The Court noted that the fact that WAP was accorded CIO status was "an
important consideration in this case, for had it been a 'religious organization,' WAP would
not have been accorded CIO status." Id. The University's Guidelines prohibited a
religious organization, defined as "an organization whose purpose is to practice a devotion
to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity," from obtaining CIO status. Id. One critic
contends that "[c]ontrary to the Supreme Court's assertion that the University denies
religious organizations CIO status," the only demands made by the University of a group
requesting CIO status are those basic requirements listed supra at text accompanying note
15. Luba L. Shur, Note, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and
the Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REV.
1665, 1667 n.10 (1995).
26. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515. WAP requested $5,862 for these printing costs.
Id.
27. Application to Petition for Certiorari at 66a, Rosenberger, (No. 94-329). The
Committee made this determination after reviewing WAP's first issue. Id. For a closer
look at the articles found in the magazine, see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Activities Committee, both of which sustained the Student Council
Appropriation Committee's denial of funding.2  Finally, Rosen-
berger and WAP filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia.29
The district court, upholding the University's denial of funds to
WAP, granted the University's motion for summary judgment. 0 The
court reasoned that the critical issue of the case was whether the
University, in creating the SAF, had created a limited public forum
or a nonpublic forum.3 Finding that the University had created a
nonpublic forum, the district court concluded that the Student
Council's denial of funding to WAP was " 'reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker'[s] views.' ,32
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment but
disagreed with its analysis.33  Holding that the Guidelines
discriminated against WAP because of its religious speech, the court
of appeals nonetheless upheld the denial of funding as permissible to
serve the compelling state interest of avoiding a violation of the
Establishment Clause.3 4  Using the three-prong test established by
the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,35 the Fourth Circuit held
that funding WAP's publication of Wide Awake would violate the
28. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
29. Id. at 2515-16; see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F.
Supp. 175 (W.D. Va. 1992).
30. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 181-84.
31. Id. at 178. The court stated that "[t]his determination is crucial as it dictates the
degree of scrutiny to be used by this court in reviewing the Board of Visitor Guidelines."
Id. Access to a limited public forum can be restricted only by a compelling state interest
narrowly drawn to effectuate that interest. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,44 (1983); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (discussing a nonpublic forum). Access to a nonpublic
forum, however, can be limited by restrictions that are" 'reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression.' " Id. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
32. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 181 (misquoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, by omitting the
letter "s" after the word "speaker' " in Rosenberger and using "views" in Rosenberger
where it is "view" in Perry.).
33. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 277-88 (4th
Cir. 1994).
34. Id. at 281. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment did not
require the state to fund speech. Id. The Supreme Court has similarly rejected the theory
that free speech rights "are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the
state." Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (denying tax-
exempt status to an organization whose primary activity was political lobbying).
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a discussion of the three prongs of the Lemon test, see
infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
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third prong of the Lemon test, which prohibits excessive state
entanglement with religion. 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit,
holding that the denial of financial support by the University
unconstitutionally denied WAP its free speech rights. 7 Agreeing
with the Fourth Circuit that the SAF was a limited public forum, but
"more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense," the
Court noted that there was "a distinction between, on the one hand,
content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against
speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."38  Because the
University's Guidelines excluded speech about "religion as a subject
matter," the Court held that "viewpoint discrimination [wa]s the
proper way to interpret the University's objection to Wide Awake."39
The majority then concluded that the University's "unremarkable
proposition" that the State should have substantial discretion to
allocate scarce resources was unpersuasive.' Similarly, the majority
36. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 285-86 (4th
Cir. 1994). The court of appeals stated that:
Because Wide Awake is a journal pervasively devoted to the discussion and
advancement of an avowedly Christian theological and personal philosophy, for
the University 'to subsidize its publication would, we believe, send an unmis-
takably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports Christian values and
wishes to promote the wide promulgation of such values.
Id. at 286. One critic has argued that the Fourth Circuit's "conclusion that a blanket
exclusion of all religious groups from SAF funding was necessary to avoid an Establish-
ment Clause violation was flawed" because of a misapplication of the Lemon test. Recent
Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 507, 509-12 (1994).
37. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524.
38. 1& at 2517. For a discussion of forum analysis, see infra notes 153-67 and accom-
panying text.
39. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517. The dissent asserted that the majority erred in
finding viewpoint discrimination because the Guidelines discriminated against an entire
class of viewpoints and were, thus, content discrimination. Ild. at 2548-50 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The majority responded that "[t]he dissent's declaration that debate is not
skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in
multiple ways." Id. at 2518.
40. Id. at 2518. In support of this proposition, the University cited Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 262 (1981), in which the Court stated: " 'Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources.' "
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276). In response, the Court
rather unconvincingly distinguished this statement as applicable only when the state is the
speaker, but not when the state "expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers." Id. at 2519. In its brief, however, the University argued that in the
public university setting,
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was unpersuaded by the University's attempt to distinguish Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches School District4 in which the Court held
that a school district that had opened school facilities to a variety of
community groups was constitutionally required to open the facilities
to religious organizations.42 In attempting to distinguish Lamb's
Chapel, the University argued that funding of speech differs from
access to school facilities in that "money is scarce and physical
facilities are not."'43 The Court dismissed this argument, which it
noted "might not be true as an empirical matter," because the
government could not "justify viewpoint discrimination among private
speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."'
The majority made clear that its main concerns were the "[v]ital
First Amendment speech principles ... at stake."'4  The Court
expressed its fear that the University's power to review publications
with the intention of censoring prohibited speech was a "danger to
liberty."46 Similarly, the Court feared the potential chilling effect on
free speech that the censorship might have.47 If enforced vigorously,
the broad prohibitions of the Guidelines would cause "major essays
[to be] excluded from student publications," including those written
by "hypothetical student contributors" such as Plato, Descartes, Marx,
and Sartre.48 Thus, the Court stated, "Plato could contrive perhaps
to submit an acceptable essay on making pasta or peanut butter
virtually every allocation of funds involves speech. The selection of courses for
the curriculum, the provision of support for research, and the hiring and
promotion of professors are obvious examples. If the First Amendment were
construed to demand content-neutrality in funding, routine decisions would invite
a lawsuit. Everyday academic determinations would trigger the search for a
compelling interest, and judicial review would supplant academic decisions in the
management of public universities. In short, to require that scarce dollars be
distributed without regard to the content of speech would be to disable public
universities from using public funds to pursue public policies.
Brief of Petitioner at 15, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.
Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329).
41. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); see infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Lamb's Chapel).
42. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2143-44.
43. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519.
44. Id
45. Id. at 2520.
46. Id.
47. Id. The majority noted that the potential for a chilling effect on speech was
"especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic
tradition." Id
48. Id.
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cookies, provided he did not point out their (necessary) imperfec-
tions., 49
Finding that the University had discriminated against WAP based
on the viewpoint of its speech, the Court next considered whether the
University's actions were excused by the necessity of complying with
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." Stating that the
University's Establishment Clause claim "lack[ed] force," the majority
nonetheless addressed it because the dissent and the Fourth Circuit
had focused their arguments on the claim' Labeling the student fee
as "an exaction" instead of a "tax,"52 and noting that funds from the
SAF would have gone to a third party printer and not directly to
WAP,53 the Court found that the University would be free from any
appearance of a lack of neutrality by subsidizing WAP.54 Similarly,
49. Id. The dissent took aim at this line of reasoning by noting that the majority
reads the word 'primarily' ('primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s)
in or about a deity or an ultimate reality') right out of the Guidelines, whereas
it is obviously crucial in distinguishing between works characterized by the
evangelism of Wide Awake and writing that merely happens to express views that
a given religion might approve, or simply descriptive writing informing a reader
about the position of a given religion.
Ie at 2550 (Souter, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 2520.
51. Id at 2521.
52. Id. at 2522. The Court stated that "[a] tax, in the general understanding of the
term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the
Government." Id (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936)). The Court
distinguished the "exaction" in this case as "a student activity fee designed to reflect the
reality that student life in its many dimensions includes the necessity of wide-ranging
speech and inquiry and that student expression is an integral part of the University's
educational mission." I&.
53. Id. at 2524. The dissent argued that "[t]he formalism of distinguishing between
payment to Wide Awake so it can pay an approved bill and payment of the approved bill
itself cannot be the basis of a decision of Constitutional law." Id. at 2545 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted that:
The printer, of course, has no option to take the money and use it to print a
secular journal instead of Wide Awake. It only gets the money because of its
contract to print a message of religious evangelism at the direction of Wide
Awake, and it will receive payment only for doing precisely that.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Herman Schwartz, The New Imprint on Religion Cases:
Is the New Majority a Wrecking Crew or a Renovation Team?, TEX. LAW., July 31, 1995,
at 22 (arguing that "[i]t makes no sense ... to distinguish between giving $5,000 to a
religious group to use solely for printing and paying the printer directly. The distinction
between taxes and student fees is equally artificial, for in both cases money raised by state
mandate is being used for religious purposes.").
54. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523-24. The majority, however, noted that "[uit is, of
course, true that if the State pays a church's bills it is subsidizing it, and we must guard
against this abuse." However, the Court concluded that WAP was not "a religious
institution, at least in the usual sense of the term." Id. at 2524. The Court did not
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the Court noted that the University had distanced itself from the
message of student publications by a disclaimer that gave the clear
impression that the student newspapers did not speak for the
University."5 Thus, the Court concluded that there was "no Es-
tablishment Clause violation in the University's honoring its duties
under the Free Speech clause.
56
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion pointed out the difficulty
of decisionmaking when "two bedrock principles"-freedom of speech
and the Establishment Clause--collide, leaving the Court with the
"hard task of judging."5" Because of the University's clear message
of independence from the speech of student newspapers funded by
the SAF,8 and because "financial assistance [wa]s distributed in a
manner that ensure[d] its use only for permissible purposes," 9
Justice O'Connor concluded that "by providing the same assistance to
Wide Awake that it does to other publications, the University would
not be endorsing the magazine's religious perspective." 0 Finally,
however, Justice O'Connor noted the possibility that the Court's
decision left the SAF susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge
by a student who believed she should not be forced to pay for speech
with which she did not agree.6
elaborate on what the "usual sense" was.
55. IL at 2523. The majority noted that" 'the government has not willfully fostered
or encouraged' any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the
University." Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2448
(1995)).
56. Id at 2525.
57. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Id at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that the University
required student groups to "include in every letter, contract, publication, or other written
materials the following disclaimer: 'Although this organization has members who are
University of Virginia students (faculty) (employees), the organization is independent of
the corporation which is the University and which is not responsible for the organization's
contracts, acts or omissions." Id at 2526-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Id at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. Id at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see infra notes 194-218 and accompanying
text (discussing the implications of such a challenge). Justice Thomas also wrote a
concurring opinion limited to an expression of his disagreement with the historical analysis
of the dissent. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528-33 (Thomas, J., concurring). Citing such
examples as the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, and Madison's actions as a Congressman
in the first Congress, Justice Thomas argued that "history provides an answer for the
constitutional question posed by this case," which was that the funding of WAP was
constitutionally permissible. Id at 2533 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Souter, in his lengthy and spirited dissent, argued that
"[t]he Court today, for the first time, approves direct funding of core
religious activities by an arm of the State," in violation of the
Establishment Clause.62 In support of this proposition, the dissent
began by taking a "closer look at Wide Awake."' Citing several
passages from the magazine, the dissent argued that Wide Awake was
a "straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with God
as revealed in Jesus Christ, and to satisfy a series of moral obligations
derived from the teachings of Jesus Christ." ' 4 Thus, as the subject
of the magazine was not that of "the scholar's study or the seminar
room, but of the evangelist's mission station and the pulpit," Justice
Souter contended that the Establishment Clause barred the use of
public funds for subsidization of its message.6 Justice Souter argued
that this prohibition was perhaps one of the clearest intentions of the
Framers in drafting the Establishment Clause 66 and he cited
62. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter quoted articles from Wide
Awake, including the following:
When you get to the final gate, the Lord will be handing out boarding passes,
and He will examine your ticket. If, in your lifetime, you did not request a seat
on His Friendly Skies Flyer by trusting Him and asking Him to be your pilot,
then you will not be on His list of reserved seats (and the Lord will know you
not). You will not be able to buy a ticket then; no amount of money or desire
will do the trick. You will be met by your chosen pilot and flown straight to Hell
on an express jet (without air conditioning or toilets, of course).
Id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Stephanie Ace, The Plane Truth, Wide Awake:
A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia, Nov./Dec. 1990, at 3). Justice Souter
also cited pieces on facially secular topics that became "platforms from which to call
readers to fulfill the tenets of Christianity." Id. at 2539. For example, in a piece on racism
in Wide Awake, the authors wrote: "God calls us to take the risks of voluntarily stepping
out of our comfort zones and to take joy in the whole richness of our inheritance in the
body of Christ. We must take the love we receive from God and share it with all peoples
of the world." Id. (quoting Liu et al., "Eracing" Mistakes, Wide Awake: A Christian
Perspective at the University of Virginia, NovJDec. 1990, at 14).
65. Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited as evidence of the Framers' intent
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment in which Madison
wrote: "Who does not see that ... the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?" Id. at 2536
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENT (1785)). Justice Souter also cited Thomas Jefferson for
the proposition that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." Id. at 2536 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1779), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 84-85 (P. Kurland & R.
Lerner eds., 1987)); see also Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to Religion: A
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numerous cases demonstrating that the Court has never upheld direct
state funding of the type of "proselytizing" found in Wide Awake.67
Not only had the Court overlooked the evangelistic nature of the
magazine, but also, Justice Souter concluded, the majority had
misapplied the Court's precedents. 6 For example, Justice Souter
argued that neutrality or evenhandedness towards religion was only
one of many factors to consider in reviewing the constitutionality of
a governmental program that directly or indirectly aided religion.69
Thus, the Rosenberger Court erred, Justice Souter explained, in its
general assumption that neutrality was a "sufficient condition of
constitutionality" for a governmental program.70 He also noted that
many governmental programs had been struck down by the Court,
even though neutral toward religion, because they were deemed to
provide direct aid to religion.7'
Justice Souter next attacked the Court's reliance on the fact that
money was paid directly to WAP's printer instead of to WAP as a
"formalism ... [that] cannot be the basis of a decision of
Constitutional law."72 Clearly WAP benefited from the payment of
its debt regardless of who actually wrote the check. 3 Similarly,
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 921 (1986) (arguing that
"if the debates of the 1780's support any proposition, it is that the Framers opposed
government financial support for religion"). But cf. Robertson, supra note 3, at 262
(noting that Madison had studied theology and arguing that Madison's views on the
Establishment Clause have been distorted by the Supreme Court).
67. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2539 (Souter, J., dissenting). The cases Justice Souter
cited included Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); School
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
254 (1977); Meek v Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 122-28
and accompanying text.
68. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2538-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2540 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2542 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
71. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Souter cited Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971), in which the Court invalidated portions of a neutral general
aid plan providing for construction of facilities at private universities to the extent that
those facilities would directly aid sectarian education. Justice Souter also cited Wolman,
433 U.S. at 252-55, in which the Court struck down a statute providing funding for field
trips to nonpublic school students, similar to the funding provided to public school
students, "because of [the] unacceptable danger that state funds would be used to foster
religion." See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2542-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of direct aid to religious schools and their students, see infra notes 115-34 and accom-
panying text.
72. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
73. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Justice Souter reasoned that the Court's comparison of this case to
cases in which a religious group was allowed access to speak in an
open forum was as "unsound as it [wa]s simple," because the
University's program would cause the government to directly fund
religious evangelism, not merely allow an evangelist to speak in an
open forum.74 In addition, Justice Souter argued that it was "fanci-
ful" to label the student fee as anything but a tax,7' because the
University exercised its power to compel a student citizen to pay the
fee and there was no procedural mechanism for a student to decline
to pay the fee if she wished to attend the University.7 6
Justice Souter's final attack was on the Court's "flaw[ed]" free
speech analysis." First, Justice Souter argued that the Court
incorrectly labeled the University's actions as viewpoint discrimination
instead of content discrimination because the Guidelines prohibited
the funding of all religious activities, not just one religion's ac-
tivities.7" Second, the dissent pointed out that the Court's reading
of the breadth of the Guidelines was seriously defective, as the
majority had neglected the word "primarily" in its analysis.79 Only
publications that primarily "promote[d] or manifest[ed]" religious
beliefs, Justice Souter argued, were barred from subsidization, not
ones that merely carried articles or pieces about religion." In
closing, Justice Souter condemned the Court for "making a shambles
out of student activity fees in public colleges"" and for failing to
heed Chief Justice Burger's warning that "in constitutional ad-
judication some steps, which when taken were thought to approach
'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain
momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill
thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop."8"
The difficulties that the Rosenberger Court faced are perhaps the
product of what many critics have condemned as an unintelligible
Establishment Clause doctrine, within which contradictions and logical
74. Id (Souter J., dissenting).
75. Id at 2546 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 2538 n.3 (Souter J., dissenting).
77. Id at 2547 (Souter J., dissenting).
78. Id at 2548-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 2549-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Id (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,624 (1971)).
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fallacies abound. 3 Much debate has occurred regarding the original
intentions of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment,
including whose intentions should be considered. 4  While some
83. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. As one critic demonstrated:
[I]t is constitutional for a state to hire a Presbyterian minister to lead the
legislature in daily prayers, but unconstitutional for a state to set aside a moment
of silence in the schools for children to pray if they want to.... It is
constitutional for the government to give money to religiously-affiliated
organizations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior, but not to teach
them science or history. It is constitutional for the government to provide
religious school pupils with books, but not with maps; with bus rides to religious
schools, but not from school to a museum on a field trip; with cash to pay for
state mandated standardized tests, but not to pay for safety-related maintenance.
It is a mess.
McConnell, supra note 3, at 119-20. Professor McConnell (one of Rosenberger's
attorneys) further argued that the inconsistent state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is the result of the changing political leanings of the Justices who have decided
Establishment Clause cases over the years. Id. at 134. For example, he asserted that
"[t]he Religion Clause jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger era was... characterized
by a hostility or indifference to religion" caused by the "politically dominant ideology of
secular liberalism" of the two Courts. Id. Conversely, a spokesperson for Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State labeled the Rosenberger decision "a rank
form of right-wing judicial activism." Joan O'Brien, Visiting U. Prof.'s Crusade Gives
Religion a Victory, Religious Cause Wins Court's Blessing, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 30,
1995, at Al; see also Joan Biskupie, Court's Conservatives Make Presence Felt, WASH.
POST, July 2, 1995, at Al (noting that the Supreme Court's Reagan appointees, with
decisions like Rosenberger, were leading the Court's jurisprudence to the right); David G.
Savage, Supreme Court Rulings Herald Rehnquist Era, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at Al
(observing the "sad coincidence" that the Supreme Court announced its conservative final
ruling on the same day former Chief Justice Warren Burger was laid to rest). But cf.
Jeremy Rabkin, Common Sense v. The Court, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 26-27.
Rabkin contends that "the conservative impulse on the Court can rarely muster a majority
without concessions to the soft, muddled sensibilities of the Court's swing voters ....
Ignore the media clucking about the Court's 'turn to the right' and don't rely on the Court
to resolve the country's most contentious social issues." Id. at 70.
84. See generally THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 3-17 (Robert S.
Alley ed., 1988) (describing the origins of the Establishment Clause); ROBERT CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 49-82,
50 (1982) (contending that "[c]omplete independence of religion and the state or absolute
separation of Church and State was not contemplated by the Framers of the First
Amendment"); THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193-222 (1986) (arguing that the
citizens who ratified the First Amendment "saw government attempts to organize and
regulate ... support [of religion] as a usurpation of power, as a violation of liberty of
conscience and free exercise of religion, and as falling within the scope of what they
termed an establishment of religion"); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager:
Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 347,348 (1995) (arguing
that "religion's role in American political life has been restrained principally by
constitutional design, not by doctrinal errors or ideological accidents"); Laycock, supra
note 66, at 878 (stating that the "framers of the religion clauses certainly did not
consciously intend to permit nonpreferential aid, and those of them who thought about the
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critics have based much of their analysis on the thoughts of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the key drafters of the Establishment
Clause,85 others argue that the intentions of the members of
Congress who passed the Amendment and the state legislators who
ratified it are more relevant.8 6 Secondly, the debate as to what
either group actually intended can be divided into two general
categories of adherents7--the separationists, who believe that the
Framers intended the First Amendment to place a wall of separation
between church and state," and the accommodationists, who believe
that the intention of the Framers was merely to guard against the
preferential treatment or establishment of one religion as a state
religion.89  Many accommodationists, also called "nonprefer-
question probably intended to forbid it"); Rodney K. Smith, Getting off on the Wrong Foot
and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984) (criticizing the historical and legal analyses of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment contained in several Supreme Court decisions).
85. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33-43 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (tracing both Madison's and Jefferson's thoughts on religious freedom during
their struggles in Virginia against a tax supporting religion and the drafting of the First
Amendment); THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 84, at 3-27
(placing emphasis on Madison's and Jefferson's thoughts on the meaning of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 113-
45 (Univ. of North Carolina Press ed., 1994) (describing Madison's thoughts on the
meaning of the First Amendment and how nonpreferentialists have misconstrued those
thoughts).
86. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 66, at 879-902 (discussing the history of the
congressional and state legislative debates on the First Amendment); see also Robertson,
supra note 3, at 261 (arguing that "[i]t is simply wrong to take Jefferson's or Madison's
views of church-state relations as the final word on the meaning of the Establishment
Clause").
87. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 124-35 (1993)
(describing the two categories and their differing views).
88. See, eg., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195,198 (1992) (arguing that religion has no place in a democratic government); Ruti
Teitel, When Separate Is Equal- Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not
Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 183-89 (1986) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause demands strict separation of religion and public education).
89. See e.g., CORD, supra note 84, at 49-82 (arguing that strict separation of church and
state was not intended by the Framers of the First Amendment); Michael McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 6-41 (calling for an accommodationist
approach in adjudicating Establishment Clause cases); Robertson, supra note 3, at 257-76
(arguing that the Establishment Clause does not compel the conclusion that religion and
government should be kept separate).
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entialists," believe that aid to religion as a whole is not only permis-
sible but desirableY0
In its first modem Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board
of Education,9' which concluded with a victory for accom-
modationists, the Supreme Court initially seemed to come down on
the side of the separationists.92 Everson marked the Court's first
attempt to set out its understanding of the Establishment Clause,
using the term "wall of separation,"' 3 an idea the Court borrowed
from Jefferson nearly seventy years earlier94 The Court noted,
following a lengthy analysis of the history of the First Amendment,
that "[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."95 Similarly, the Court declared that "[n]o tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 96
The Everson Court, however, then went on to conclude that
while the Establishment Clause requires that the state be "neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary."97 Thus, the Court
held that the state of New Jersey was not prohibited from reimbursing
parents of parochial school children along with parents of public
school children for city bus fares incurred in sending their children to
school.9' The contradictory conclusions of the majority led the
90. Robertson, supra note 3, at 276 ("[W]ithin reasonable limits, government ought
to aid and encourage religion, and religious believers should not need to check their beliefs
at the capital [sic] door.").
91. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
92. See LEVY, supra note 85, at 150-51 (describing Everson as laying down the
principle of separation of church and state in Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Carl
H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence,
Conflict or Chaos? 70 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 581, 614 (1995) (noting that "[i]t can
generally be said that the Court's cases beginning with Everson were animated by a theory
of separationism"); Arlen Specter, Defending the WaL Maintaining Church/State
Separation in America, 18 HARV. JL. & PUB. POL'Y, 575, 581 (1992) (noting that "it is
Everson ... that [critics] excoriat[e] for its role in fixing the concept of a wall of
church/state separation in American jurisprudence").
93. See CORD, supra note 84, at 109.
94. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 (1878).
95. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id at 17-18.
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dissent to remark: "[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating
complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters."99 This contradiction also led
one critic to remark that Everson "may hold the record for being
cited most often as a precedent on opposite sides of the same
question."'"0
Twenty years later, the most significant case in Establishment
Clause doctrine was decided.' In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'02 the
Supreme Court invalidated Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes
that provided for direct forms of aid to parochial school
education." The Pennsylvania statute provided for reimbursements
to nonpublic schools for materials, textbooks, and teacher salaries
used in teaching secular subjects."° The Rhode Island statute
allowed for salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in
private schools. 5 The Court found both statutes to be un-
constitutional violations of the Establishment Clause.0 6
Expressing a separationist perspective similar to that of the
majority in Everson," the Lemon Court noted that "the three main
99. Id. at 19. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further commented on the
opinion of the Court by noting that "[t]he case which irresistibly comes to mind as the
most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will
ne'er consent",--consented.' " Id.
100. James C. Kirby, Jr., Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separation to Detente
in Church-State Relations, 55 N.C. L. REV. 563, 565 (1977).
101. See generally LEVY, supra note 85, at 146-79 (describing judicial tests used prior
to and after Lemon in Establishment Clause cases); Jay A. Sekulow et al., Proposed
Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 1017,1059-71 (1995) (explaining the Lemon test and its misuse) [hereinafter Sekulow
et al., Proposed Guidelines]; Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A
Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535,
1550-80 (1995) (explaining application of the Lemon test in several cases and proposing
different tests); Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause
Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO. L. REV. 653, 653 (1995) (noting that "[a]fter the
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, one three-pronged test controlled all Establishment
Clause issues") (citations omitted).
102. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
103. Id. at 625. The statutes were PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971) and
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (Supp. 1970).
104. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609.
105. Id. at 607.
106. Id. at 625.
107. See Kagan, supra note 3, at 630 (noting that the Lemon test "articulates the
separationist view of the Establishment Clause that has informed the [Court] majority's
thinking"); McConnell, supra note 3, at 128 (arguing that the Lemon test "has an inherent
tendency to devalue religious exercise").
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evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection ... [are] 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "10I Drawing
upon past Establishment Clause cases, the Court then set forth a
three-prong test to determine whether a state action violates the
Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; 9 second, its principle or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;"0 finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' ""' The Supreme Court has used this test in numerous
cases over the last three decades." 2  However, many critics,
including Justice Scalia, have condemned the Lemon test because it
has been misapplied or ignored to fit the particular needs of the court
that applies it."3  This "nonapplication, malapplication, and
108. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
109. Ld.
110. ld. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968)). Michael McConnell
has argued that the phrase "inhibits religion" should be removed from the test as
superfluous because "in actual practice, actions 'inhibiting' religion are dealt with under
the Free Exercise Clause." McConnell, supra note 3, at 118 n.9.
111. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
112. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-89
(1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410-14 (1984); Committee. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-85 (1973).
113. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150, in which Justice Scalia condemned the
Lemon test by noting:
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish
to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a
middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than helpful signposts." Such
a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent
state; one never knows when one might need him.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted) (quoting Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). Justice Scalia prefaced this observation with the following:
"Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again. . . ." Id. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Although the Supreme Court does not consistently utilize the Lemon test, it is noteworthy
that "lower courts have made the Lemon test the sole means for winnowing out instances
in which government has become excessively entangled with religion." Sekulow et al.,
supra note 3, at 358-59. Unfortunately, argues Sekulow, "rigid and mechanical application
of the vaguely understandable yet easily manipulable Lemon test often leads to absurd
results." Id at 359. In support of this proposition, Sekulow cites the disposition of
Rosenberger in the Fourth Circuit. Id. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit opinion, see
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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misapplication of Lemon" is said to be the cause of the Court's
inconsistent and confusing Establishment Clause decisions.'
Perhaps one of the most important and sensitive areas of
Establishment Clause doctrine in which the Lemon test has been
utilized is the area of government financial assistance to religious
schools or students attending those schools.' Generally, whether
aid to parochial schools is characterized as direct or indirect will affect
whether the aid will be upheld under the Lemon test."6 If the aid
is considered indirect then it will usually satisfy the Lemon test."7
For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,"' the Court upheld a Washington statute that provided a
blind student at a Christian college with vocational rehabilitation
assistance."' The Court held that the first prong of the Lemon test
was satisfied by the clearly secular purpose of promoting the well-
being of the visually handicapped." Regarding the second prong
of the Lemon test (aid cannot promote or inhibit religion) the Court
found that, because aid flowed directly to the student instead of to the
institution, the institution was not being subsidized by the state, nor
114. Kagan, supra note 3, at 634. See also Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 101, at 1060 (noting that the "Supreme Court has ignored the Lemon test in a
number of recent cases and relegated its three prongs to the status of 'useful guideposts'
in others"); Laura Underkuffler-Freud, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular:
A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837,858-
73 (discussing analytical and empirical problems with the application of the Lemon test);
Russell, supra note 101, at 660 n.53 (listing several Supreme Court Justices who have
criticized Lemon's legacy and have sought to revise the test).
115. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, FAITH AND FREEDOM 96-107 (1994)
(discussing the numerous issues surrounding the use of governmental money to aid
religious schools); GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER 65-101 (1993) (explaining the
Supreme Court's adjudication of several cases involving aid to religious schools); T.
Jonathan Adams, Note, Interpreting State Aid to Religious Schools Under the Establishment
Clause, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1039,1043-59 (1994) (reviewing cases involving direct state aid to
parochial schools).
116. See LEVY, supra note 85, at 165 (discussing the Burger Court's distinction between
direct and indirect aid). Direct aid is a monetary subsidy that goes directly to the religious
institution. Id. Indirect aid may come in the form of an "indirect economic benefit" such
as a tax exemption, id., or may go to a third party "for the benefit of the student, not the
religious school," id. at 171. See also FRANKEL, supra note 115, at 98 (noting "the quest
for 'indirect' or partial economic assistance remains essentially a kind of second-best or
sideshow position" for those seeking governmental aid for parochial schools).
117. LEVY, supra note 85, at 162-67.
118. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
119. Id. at 489. The plaintiff in Witters was seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or
youth director. Id. at 483.
120. Id. at 485.
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was the state conferring a message of state endorsement of
religion.'
However, if the Court determines that a governmental program
directly aids religious schools, then generally the aid will be in-
validated." For example, in School District of the City of Grand
Rapids v. Ball," the Court invalidated a Michigan statute that
provided for public school teachers to teach secular subjects on
nonpublic school premises during the school day.24 After com-
paring several cases in which the Court had invalidated what it
considered direct aid to religious schools, the Ball Court concluded
that the primary effect of the Michigan program was a "direct and
substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise. ' '""s Prior to
121. Id at 486-89. The Court did not address the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon
test because the lower court had not addressed the issue, thus rendering the record on that
issue incomplete. See id. at 485. In his concurrence in Witters, Justice Powell observed
that Witters was similar to Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983), in which the
Supreme Court sustained a tax deduction for educational expenses even though the benefit
flowed largely to parents of children attending parochial schools. Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-
92 (Powell, J. concurring). The Court's analysis in Mueller was similar to that in Witters
in that the decision rested on the fact that the "benefit to religion resulted from the
'numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children.' " Witters, 474 U.S.
at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399). Strangely enough, eight
years after Witters was decided, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462
(1993), the Supreme Court decided a case very similar to Witters in both its facts and
analysis without specifically using the Lemon test even though the Ninth Circuit in Zobrest
had rested its decision on Lemon. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-69 (validating a government
program that provided a deaf student at a parochial high school with a sign language
interpreter).
122. See LEVY, supra note 85, at 167 (noting the Court's position that a direct money
subsidy for parochial schools is impermissible sponsorship of religion).
123. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
124. Id. at 397-98.
125. 1& at 393 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,250 (1977)); see also Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (invalidating a New York law providing public
school teachers for remedial classes for parochial school students on parochial school
property as an impermissible direct aid of religion). The direct aid principle was not the
only rationale upon which Ball was decided. The Court in Ball also focused on the
"symbolic union of government and religion in one sectarian enterprise." Ball, 473 U.S.
at 392. Additionally, the Court in Ball expressed its concern that a public school teacher
in a religious setting "may well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the
environment in which they teach, while students will perceive the instruction ... in the
context of the dominantly religious message of the institution, thus reinforcing the
indoctrinating effect." Ball, 473 U.S. at 388; see also McConnell, supra note 3, at 122
(arguing that the Court's bias against religion is evident in "[t]he evocative words in this
passage---'conform,' 'dominantly religious,' 'indoctrination,' "-which demonstrate the
Court's assumption that "religious convictions are reached not through thoughtful
consideration and experience, but through conformity and indoctrination").
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Ball, in Meek v. Pittenger"2 and Wolman v. Walter,127 the Court
invalidated state programs providing for the loan of instructional
equipment to parochial schools because the programs advanced the
"primary, religion-oriented educational function of the sectarian
school."'"
Similarly, two decades after Meek and Wolman, in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,29 the Court found that the state
of New York had impermissibly advanced religion by directly aiding
the religious schools of the Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict
form of Judaism, by creating a special school district that followed the
village's geographical lines. ° The purpose of the statute was to
allow for public education of Satmar children who were handicapped,
while not requiring that they attend school with non-Satmar
children.' The Court, while not specifically using the Lemon test,
held that New York violated what would have been the second and
third prongs of Lemon because there was no " 'effective means of
guaranteeing' that governmental power will be ... neutrally
126. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
127. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
128. Meek, 421 U.S. at 364; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-51. The instructional materials
at issue in Meek included such items as maps, tape recorders, and projectors. Meek, 421
U.S. at 354-55. Part of the loan programs in both Meek and Wolman, however, provided
for the loan of textbooks; this was upheld by the Court because of prior precedent in
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-60; Wolman, 433 U.S.
at 236-38. In Allen, the Court held that textbooks could be loaned to parochial school
students as long as the books were supplied directly to students themselves and the content
of the books was strictly secular. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-45. Seemingly inconsistent in
Wolman was the Court's invalidation of a portion of the governmental program which
provided for field trip transportation to nonpublic schools in light of Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947), which upheld reimbursement for travel expenses incurred
by parochial school children on the way to school. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55. The
Court in Wolman distinguished Everson under the direct aid principle because reimbur-
sements in Everson flowed directly to the parents of parochial school children and not to
the parochial school itself. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-53. Finally, the Ohio statute at issue
in Wolman provided for speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services, for
therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services, and for the provision and grading of state-
funded standardized objective tests to be given on the premises of parochial schools.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238-48. All of these provisions were upheld. Id. The testing was
upheld largely because the service provided was impersonal and brief, id. at 238-41, and
the remedial and diagnostic services were upheld largely because they were not provided
on the actual parochial school premises, id at 241-48. The Lemon test was applied to each
provision of the Wolman statute. Id. at 236-55.
129. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
130. Id. at 2494.
131. Id. at 2485-86.
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employed"'' (primary effect prong) and because there was " 'a
fusion of governmental and religious functions' " (entanglement
prong).'33 Although the reasoning of the Justices differed, the
thrust of the plurality opinion was that the state could not directly
promote religion in this fashionY 4
Another trend in the Court's Establishment Clause analysis in the
education context is that the Court is generally more likely to
invalidate aid flowing to parochial secondary schools than aid to
sectarian higher education. 5  For example, in Roemer v. Board of
132. Id. at 2491. The Court noted that "[t]he fact that this school district was created
by a special and unusual Act of the legislature... gives reason for concern whether the
benefit received by the Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally
to other religious (and nonreligious) groups." Id.
133. Id. at 2487-88 (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for not
explicitly using the Lemon test because, in Justice Blackmun's words, "the two principles
on which the opinion bases its conclusion that the legislative act is constitutionally invalid
essentially are the second and third Lemon criteria." Id. at 2495 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
134. See Welton 0. Seal, Jr., Note, "Benevolent Neutrality" Toward Religion: Still an
Elusive Ideal After Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1641,
1645-52 (1995) (discussing the conclusions of the plurality). Several Justices in Kiryas Joel
wrote separate opinions. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted his "disagreement
with any suggestion that today's decision signals a departure from the principles described
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The opinion of the Court... relies upon several decisions ...
that explicitly rested on the criteria set forth in Lemon." Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494-95
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted). However, Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurrence to express her discontent with Lemon, arguing that, "shoehorning new
problems into a test that does not reflect the special concerns raised by those problems
tends to deform the language of the test." Id. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy's concurrence focused in part on the
potential for civil strife when the government prefers one religion over another. Id. at
2501-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In a vehement dissent, Justice Scalia
argued that the Court had disabled a religiously homogeneous group from exercising
political power benevolently conferred upon it without regard to religion. Id. at 2505-08
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Kirby, supra note 100, at 571-74; see IVERS, supra note 115, at 69 (noting that the
Burger Court "took a firm line against parochial statutes that earmarked public monies for
direct and indirect use by religious elementary and secondary schools .... [but] developed
far less stringent rules for governmental funds that flowed to sectarian colleges").
Professor Kirby suggests that one reason for this different treatment, at least where
Catholic schools are concerned, is that "[a]t the lower levels, Catholic education is an
integral part of the practice and propagation of the Catholic faith" while "under national
standards of academic freedom and tenure, there is much truly separable secular
instruction in church-related higher education." Kirby, supra note 100, at 572; see also
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid
to its Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to the Church
itself").
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Public Works of Maryland,3 6 the Court upheld a Maryland statute
that granted aid in the form of subsidies to all private institutions of
higher learning as long as the subsidy was not "utilized by. the
institution for sectarian purposes."'37 In upholding the statute, the
Court concluded that the colleges were not "pervasively sec-
tarian '  in purpose and in fact were "characterized by a high
degree of institutional autonomy"'39 from their religious af-
filiates."4  Thus, the Court concluded that the Lemon standard
would not be offended by the aid.'a
One of the areas of Establishment Clause doctrine in which the
Court's decisions have remained fairly consistent are those cases in
which religious groups seek access to educational facilities open to the
public.42 Generally, the Court has noted that to deny a religious
group its freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment,
in a state-created forum is to "demonstrate not neutrality but hostility
toward religion."" One of the earliest cases to test this issue was
Widmar v. Vincent,' 4 in which a registered student religious group
sought access to facilities at the University of Missouri at Kansas City,
136. 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
137. Id. at 741 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 77A, § 68A (1975)).
138. Id. at 755.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (upholding state aid to a
Baptist college and holding that "the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that
all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends"); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (upholding construction grants to colleges for buildings and facilities used for
secular educational purposes). In Roemer, the Court distinguished its decision from that
made in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the Court
invalidated aid to religious secondary and elementary schools because the schools were
primarily sectarian in purpose. Id. at 796-98. Unlike the colleges involved in Roemer, the
Court noted, secondary schools "placed religious restrictions on admission and also faculty
appointments; that they enforced obedience to religious dogma; that they required
attendance at religious services and the study of particular religious doctrine; [and] that
they were an 'integral part' of the religious mission of the sponsoring church." Roemer,
426 U.S. at 752 n.18; see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 767-68 (noting the same phenomenon).
141. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 766-67.
142. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Th[e] insistence
on government neutrality toward religion explains why we have held that schools may not
discriminate against religious groups by denying them equal access to facilities that the
schools make available to all."); Jeff Homer, Access to Educational Facilities for School
and Public Groups, 54 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (West 1989) (noting that the Court has
"generally upheld the use of school facilities by outside church groups for secular
purposes"); see generally IVERS, supra note 115, at 17-41 (discussing equal access cases
under the Establishment Clause).
143. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248 (1990).
144. 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
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to conduct its meetings.'45 The group was denied access because of
a University regulation that prohibited the use of school buildings "for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."' 6 The Court
held that the denial of access to the religious group represented
content-based discrimination 47 and that the state's interest in
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation was not sufficiently
compelling because no such violation would occur.'"
Twelve years after Widmar, the Court faced similar facts in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,4 9
however, in Lamb's Chapel the access was sought by a religious group
to use secondary and elementary school facilities open to the public
by the school district.5 The religious group was an evangelical
church, Lamb's Chapel, that sought to use a public school facility to
show a set of films on parenting from a Christian perspective.' In
requiring that the school district open its facilities to the religious
group, the Court held that "as in Widmar, there would have been no
realistic danger that the community would think that the District was
endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion
or to the Church would have been no more than incidental.'
152
145. I at 265.
146. Id.
147. But cf Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (finding discrimination against religious
groups to be viewpoint discrimination instead of content discrimination).
148. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75. The Court used the Lemon test to reach the
conclusion that "a religious organization's enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits does
not violate the prohibition against the 'primary advancement' of religion." Id. at 273.
149. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
150. Id at 2143.
151. Id. at 2143-44. The film series contained lectures by Dr. James Dobson, a clinical
professor of pediatrics and a best-selling author, on "influences of the media that could
only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an
early stage." Id. at 2144.
152. Id. at 2148. Like the Widmar Court, the Lamb's Chapel Court used the three-part
Lemon test to find that "the challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does
not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not
foster an excessive entanglement with religion." Id. This led Justice Scalia, in his opinion
concurring in the judgment, to make his now-famous remark condemning the Lemon test.
See supra note 113. In response to Justice Scalia's condemnation, Justice White, writing
for the majority, noted that "while we are somewhat diverted by Justice Scalia's evening
at the cinema, we return to the reality that there is a proper way to inter an established
decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled."
Id. at 2148 n.7; see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440, 2444-64 (1995) (holding that the state of Ohio was required to allow the Ku Klux
Klan to place a cross in the Capitol Square, which the Court regarded as a traditional
public forum). The Court in Pinette noted that "[w]e have twice previously addressed the
combination of private religious expression, a forum available for public use, content-based
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In addition to the Establishment Clause issues presented by cases
such as Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, the Court often faces-as in
Rosenberger- accompanying freedom of speech issues. One critic has
observed a "tension inherent in attempting to reconcile the
constitutional promises of church-state separation, religious free
exercise, and freedom of speech embodied in the First
Amendment."'53  One reason for this tension is that freedom of
speech cases involving the deceptively well-defined three categories
of fora-the traditional public forum, the limited public forum and the
non-public forum-have caused tremendous confusion.' 4  As one
critic noted:
In a world of disputatious academic criticism, the unrelenting
and unanimous condemnation of contemporary public forum
doctrine is truly remarkable. The critics' reasons for
rejecting the doctrine are nearly always the same. Public
forum doctrine is said to depend upon a "myopic focus on
formalistic labels" that "serve only to distract attention from
the real stakes" at issue in disputes over public use of
government resources for communicative purposes.55
At least one Supreme Court Justice has argued, however, that the
forum categories were not meant to be definite, explaining that "[t]he
line between limited public forums and nonpublic forums 'may blur
at the edges' and is really more in the nature of a continuum than a
definite demarcation.', 156
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' As-
sociation is the Supreme Court opinion most often cited for its
regulation [as opposed to viewpoint-based regulation], and a State's interest in complying
with the Establishment Clause. Both times, we have struck down the restriction on
religious content." Id. at 2446 (citing Widmar and Lamb's Chapel). Curiously, however,
the Court in Pinette did not use the Lemon test to strike down the restriction as it did in
Widmar and Lamb's Chapel Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273; Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
153. IvERS, supra note 115, at 17.
154. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV.
1219, 1224 (1984) (arguing that the three categories distract "attention from the first
amendment values at stake in a given case"); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public
Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 335, 341 (1986)
(condemning the doctrine as a confusing and simplistic "jurisprudence of labels").
155. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1716 n.7 (1987) (quoting Stone, supra note
10, at 93); see also Robert L. Waring, Comment, Talk Is Not Cheap: Funded Student
Speech at Public Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 541, 555-62 (1995) (discussing
public fora in the context of mandatory university student fees).
156. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 819 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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definition and explanations of the three forum categories.'57 In
Perry, the Court stated that "[i]n a public forum, by definition, all
parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must
demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class
of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject."' 58 However, in
defining the nonpublic forum, the Court recognized that "public
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication is governed by different standards.""1 9 Within these
nonpublic fora, the Court declared, "the State may reserve the forum
for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view."1
6°
Additionally, a forum may be created for a limited purpose such
as use by certain groups or for discussion of certain subjects. 6'
However, the Court has held that if the limited forum maintains the
characteristics of a public forum, then, as long as the State maintains
the forum, "it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum .... [such that] a content-based prohibition must be
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest."'62 If the
limited forum is deemed to be a nonpublic limited forum, then the
Court has required the State's restrictions on speech to be merely
reasonable in light of the stated purpose of the forum.'6'
For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP,' the Court held that the
federal government had created a limited nonpublic forum by creating
the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive aimed at federal
employees and limited to nonprofit charitable organizations that
provided health and welfare services to individuals and families.'5
Thus, the Court held that the government could restrict the speech of
the forum as long as the restrictions satisfied the reasonableness
standard and were viewpoint neutral.'" However, the Court
157. Gail P. Sorenson, The 'Public Forum Doctrine' and Its Application in School and
College Cases, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 445 n.2 (1991); Waring, supra note 155, at 555.
158. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
159. Id at 46.
160. Id
161. Id at 46 n.7 (noting that "[a] public forum may be created for a limited purpose
such as use by certain groups ... or for the discussing of certain subjects").
162. Id at 46.
163. Id
164. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
165. Id. at 801-06.
166. Id at 806.
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warned that "the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he
espouses on an otherwise includible subject."167
Like the forum determination, the inquiry into whether a
government action is a content-based restriction or a viewpoint-based
restriction is a significant one because of the consequences that follow
such a determination.'6s When the government restricts particular
views taken by a speaker on a subject, instead of the whole subject
matter, the violation of the First Amendment is more blatant.169 In
the Court's own words, "[v]iewpoint discrimination is thus an
egregious form of content discrimination.""'  For example, in
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,' the Court struck down a St. Paul
ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated speech based on race,
religion, creed, or gender.7 The Court held that the ordinance
went "beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination,"'73 because it restricted one side of a debate-the
side that used bias-motivated speech-and not the other side-those
167. Id.
168. See Post, supra note 155, at 1824-32 (discussing the differences between viewpoint
discrimination and content-based discrimination and the reasons why viewpoint
discrimination is impermissible).
169. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
170. Id. Professor Post has demonstrated the difference between viewpoint and content
discrimination in the following manner:
University A chooses not to fund any political groups. All University A's
political student groups are denied funding based on the political content of their
speech [this is content discrimination] .... Meanwhile, University B refuses to
fund any political group that advocates the overthrow of the current government
[this is viewpoint discrimination] ....
Post, supra note 155, at 1751. Another observer has stated: "University A's policy will
likely survive constitutional scrutiny because it treats all political groups equally ....
University B's policy will not survive constitutional scrutiny because it treats political
student groups unequally, discriminating among their individual political viewpoints."
Elizabeth E. Gordon, Comment, University Regulation of Student Speech: Considering
Content-Based Criteria Under Public Forum and Subsidy Doctrines, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 393, 399.
171. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
172. Id. at 395-96.
173. Id at 391.
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who spoke in favor of tolerance and equality. 4  This viewpoint
discrimination, held the Court, was impermissible. 5
In light of the confused state of both the freedom of speech and
Establishment Clause doctrines, it is difficult to determine whether
the Court in Rosenberger remained consistent with its past holdings.
The Court provided no new insight as to its position on the Lemon
test 76 but did add clarity to its views on several freedom of speech
issues in the context of the mandatory student fee system at public
universities.' While some critics have viewed the Rosenberger
decision as a victory for accommodationists,'7 8 others decry the fact
that the Court did not seem eager to profess explicit support for the
accommodationist perspective.'7 9  Most critics agree, however, that
174. 1& at 391-92. Thus, the Court noted that
[d]isplays containing some words-odious racial epithets, for example-would be
prohibited to proponents of all views. But 'fighting words' that do not
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender-aspersions upon a
person's mother, for example-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the
placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but
could not be used by those speakers' opponents.
Id. at 391.
175. Id.
176. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Phillip Walzer & Esther Diskin, Religious Free Speech, Some Colleges
May Choose to Stop Funding All Activities, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 30, 1995, at Al
(quoting Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, as
saying, "[w]e have crossed a critical threshold in the fight for religious liberty"). In
response to this "victory" for accommodationists, however, Barry Lynn, Executive Director
of Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, said: "When you have a
public university picking the pockets of some students to pay for the evangelizing of other
students, that's not free speech. That's tyranny." Id.
179. See, e.g., Julia Lieblich, Christian Soldier Wins Skirmish, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July
1, 1995, at D8 (noting that "[w]hat rankles Rosenberger is that four judges dissented,
maintaining that the decision violated the Constitution"). Rosenberger has expressed his
discontent with the lack of unanimity in the Court in this case elsewhere:
What is shocking to me is not the fact that I won, but that four of the nine
justices failed to see the light. Four of the highest judges in our nation, not to
mention the judges in the lower courts who ruled against us, believe that the
University of Virginia was justified in denying Wide Awake equal access. This
means that replacing just one justice could give us a strikingly different decision
in future religious liberty cases.
Prepared Testimony of Ronald W. Rosenberger Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 12, 1995) available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW file.
Other critics have commented on Justice O'Connor's emphasis on a resolution of
Establishment Clause cases that involves case by case analysis with no "categorical
obstinacy," Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring), as limiting the
strength and clarity of the victory for accommodationists. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note
53 at 22 (noting that Justice O'Connor "has been on the winning side in every religion
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Rosenberger will clearly, and most likely detrimentally, affect the
future of university student fee systems.8
One significant aspect of the Rosenberger decision is that the
Court decidedly chose not to invoke the Lemon test in reaching its
decision that funding WAP was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause. However, the fact that the Court merely chose not to use
Lemon, rather than explicity overruling it, may not be the victory that
Lemon's opponents desire.'' Just two years before Rosenberger
was decided, in Lamb's Chapel, Justice White remarked that Lemon
had not been overruled and thus was a necessary aspect of deciding
Establishment Clause cases."s Many critics noted prior to Rosen-
berger that a majority of the Rosenberger Court seemed poised to
overrule Lemon.' However, the Court provided no explanation
for its nonapplication. Inevitably, the Rosenberger Court will draw
criticism for not clarifying its position on the notorious Lemon test.
By implication, it appears that the Court did make several
decisions regarding its position on free speech issues. For example,
one of the most hotly contested issues of the briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court in Rosenberger was whether the University's action
constituted content or viewpoint discrimination." 4 In its brief, WAP
cited Lamb's Chapel, in which the Court stated that "it discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the
presentation of all views ... except those dealing with the subject
matter from a religious standpoint."'" However, in Windmar, the
case upon which Lamb's Chapel was largely based, the Court held
that "we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently
case, often writing separately," for the past decade); see also Lieblich, supra, at D8
(describing Rosenberger as "distressed" that Justice O'Connor "wrote that the First
Amendment's establishment clause on religion could not 'easily be reduced to a single test'
.suggest[ing] that the Court was going to tackle church-state issues case by case").
180. See infra notes 194-218 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Jennifer Ferranti, High Court Mandates Equal Treatment for Religion:
University Ordered to Fund Wide Awake Magazine, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 14,1995,
at 62 (noting that "legal experts caution that the victory is a limited one" for accom-
modationists because, among other aspects of the opinion, Lemon was not explicitly
overruled).
182. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 n.7 (1993).
183. See, eg., Sekulow et al., supra note 3, at 358 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas had all expressed their discomfort
with Lemon).
184. See Brief of Petitioner at 16-20, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (No. 94-329); Brief of Respondent at 6-8, Rosenberger (No. 94-329).
185. Brief of Petitioner at 18, Rosenberger (No. 94-329) (quoting Lamb's Chapel, 113
S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993)) (emphasis added).
1252 [Vol. 74
WALL OF SEPARATION
'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination 'against respon-
dents' religious speech.' 86  One significant aspect of the Rosen-
berger opinion, then, is that the Court concluded that a prohibition on
all forms of religious speech is viewpoint discrimination and not
content discrimination."s
Similarly, the Supreme Court appeared to establish that a student
fee system at a university constituted a limited public forum. 8 In
Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court held that the university setting
could generally be thought of as a limited public forum because "the
University was not required to create the forum in the first
place."'" The Widmar Court required the University to show a
compelling state interest for discriminating against the content of
student speech, even though the Court recognized that the University
could close the forum completely."9 However, lower courts have
split on the issue of whether student fee systems at public universities,
as opposed to a university's physical facilities, are limited public fora
or nonpublic fora.'9 Even though the district court in Rosenberger
held that the University of Virginia had created a nonpublic
186. Widmar v Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (emphasis added). In one significant
lower court student fee case, the Eighth Circuit used the concepts of content and viewpoint
discrimination interchangeably. See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361,
366 (8th Cir. 1988). One student commentator argued that the Court's failure to
distinguish between viewpoint and content discrimination was entirely appropriate because
"[w]hen the subject matter of which a group speaks is inherently controversial, it is difficult
to categorize the discrimination against it as either content-based or viewpoint-based."
Carolyn Wiggin, Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory
Student Fees to Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009, 2034
(1994).
187. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
188. Id.
189. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268.
190. Id. The Court recognized that
First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment." . . . A university differs in significant respects from
public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the
use of its campus and facilities.
Id at 268 n.5 (citation omitted).
191. See, e.g., Tipton v. University of Hawaii, 15 F.3d 922, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1994)
(upholding district court's summary judgment finding that the university's student fee
system was a nonpublic forum); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 1001 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1992) (holding that student fee system is a limited public forum);
Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 479 n.7 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the campus of a
public university possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum).
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forum,92 the Supreme Court concluded that the student fee system
was a limited public forum though "more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense."'"
One potential consequence of the Rosenberger opinion is that it
calls into question the longevity of student fee programs at public
universities around the country. As Justice O'Connor warned in her
concurrence in Rosenberger, "I note the possibility that the student
fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting
student that she should not be compelled to pay for speech with
which she disagrees.' 9 4 In such a case, the Court could be faced
with "[f]our distinct lines of First Amendment doctrine" never before
combined in one case, 95 including: freedom of speech and as-
sociation, viewpoint limitations on speech,96 public forum analysis,
and the right of a university to allocate scarce resources.' 97 The
Rosenberger Court clarified its position on three of these four lines of
First Amendment doctrine, leaving the compelled speech and
association issues of mandatory student fees for a later deter-
mination.'98
Several of the Supreme Court's prior cases may be relevant in a
suit challenging the assessment of student activities fees used to
support speech, especially the Court's decisions regarding challenges
to compelled association in the union fee context. 9  For example,
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,' the Supreme Court was
faced with a challenge to the " 'agency shop' arrangement, whereby
every employee represented by a union-even though not a union
192. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 180
(W.D. Va. 1992), affd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
193. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517. One commentator has argued that this decision
will affect the Court's future resolution of forum analysis regarding the funding of
"cyberspace" at public universities. Joseph C. Beckham & William Schmid, Jr., Forum
Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Public Sector Higher Education, 98 EDUC. L. REP.
11 (1995).
194. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195. Waring, supra note 155, at 542 (quoting Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1071 (3d
Cir. 1985) (Adams, J., dissenting)).
196. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
197. Waring, supra note 155, at 542.
198. The Rosenberger decision clarified the Court's position on the content versus
viewpoint discrimination issue, see supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text, and public
forum analysis of the student fee system, see supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
The Court also dismissed the University's arguments that it needed wide discretion in the
distribution of its fees. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
199. Waring, supra note 155, at 547-51.
200. 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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member-must pay to the union, as a condition of employment, a
service fee equal in amount to union dues."2"1  Some of the fees
were used by the labor union for political activities not involving
collective bargaining.' Thus, the Court noted that these fees might
hinder "an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of
ideas, or to refrain from doing so."'3 While it validated the man-
dated fees used for collective-bargaining purposes, the Court held that
the agency could not force the union employees to pay for "the
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to
... collective-bargaining."'  The precise procedure of avoiding the
mandatory fee for political activities was left up to the parties.' 5
Similarly, in Keller v. State Bar of California,' the Court dealt
with the issue of mandatory fee payments to the California State Bar
Association and the use of those fees to fund ideological activities
such as lobbying the state legislature, filing amicus curiae briefs, and
approving resolutions of the state barn' Relying on Abood, a
unanimous Supreme Court held that the bar association, resembling
a union, cannot use its mandatory fees to fund "activities having
political or ideological coloration."'  The Court also noted that the
" 'constitutional requirements for the [association's] collection of...
fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee
before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.' ,239
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
mandatory student fees and the compelled speech and associational
implications the fees present, several lower courts have done so.
210
201. Id. at 211. The union in Abood was a union of public school teachers. Id.
202. Id. at 213.
203. Id. at 222.
204. Id. at 235-36.
205. Id. at 237-42.
206. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
207. Id. at 5.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Id. at 16 (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1046 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman,
J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
210 (1986))).
210. See, e.g., Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 995-1001 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 300 (1992) (upholding use of mandatory student fees at the State University of New
York at Albany for a public interest research group); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060,
1068 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding unconstitutional the use of mandatory student fees at Rutgers
University to support an organization engaged in research, lobbying, and advocacy for
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Smith v. Regents of the University of California,2 ' decided by the
California Supreme Court, is one example of several recent lower
court cases in which students have challenged the student fee system
at their universities on compelled speech and associational grounds.
The plaintiffs in Smith, students at the University of California at
Berkeley, sought to recover the portion of their student fees that
funded speech with which they did not agree. While the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the Regents of the University of
California were constitutionally permitted to collect the student fees,
the money raised by the fees could be used only for activities that
were "germane" to education.1 3 The California Supreme Court
stated that recognizing all student political activity as germane to
education would put "a much greater burden on speech and as-
sociational fights than the high court [in Keller] necessarily con-
templated when it used that term [germane]. 214  In identifying
which activities could permissibly receive funding, the Court suggested
that the University weigh each organization's "political and ideological
activities" against its educational benefit with the purpose of
protecting student's fights from subsidization of political speech.215
The Smith Court's analysis, if adopted by the United States
Supreme Court-a plausible outcome in light of Abood and
Keller-would probably sound a death knell for the student fee
system as it exists today. Facing.the possibility of having to establish
a system that would require such immense oversight, many univer-
sities would most likely opt to avoid the entanglement by dismantling
their existing student fee systems. In response to the Rosenberger
decision, the University of Virginia established a committee to "come
up with a plan for making student fees at least partially optional to
social change), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 477-80
(4th Cir. 1983) (upholding use of student fees at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill for the support of the student newspaper); Larson v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Neb., 204 N.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Neb. 1973) (affirming denial of injunctive relief in
a challenge to the use of mandatory student fees to fund a student newspaper). For a
detailed and informative discussion of all of these cases, see generally Waring, supra note
155, at 570-85.
211. 844 P.2d 500 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993).
212. Id. at 505. The fee collected by the University in 1982 when the case began was
$12.50 per student, per quarter. Id. at 504. More than 150 student organizations were
funded by the student fees including the Campus Abortion Rights Action League, the Gay
and Lesbian League, the National Organization for Women, and Greenpeace Berkeley.
Id. at 504-05.
213. Itt at'507-08.
214. Idt at 508.
215. Itt. at 513.
1256 [Vol. 74
WALL OF SEPARATION
avoid future lawsuits." '216  The committee is also considering
abolishing the student fee system altogether.217 Other universities
are responding to the Rosenberger decision by discussing potential
modifications of their own student fee systems and by closely
observing what critics have called the "conservative" approach to
modification at the University of Virginia.218
Some commentators have argued that the end of government
funding of speech would be a much easier response to Rosenberger
for public universities.2 ' As one observer noted, "The most sen-
sible solution is no government funding, which would avoid vexing
constitutional problems and acrimonious social disputes."' Other
commentators view the potential end of the student fee system not
only as a sensible response, but also as a desirable one:
If cities were run like some colleges and universities, all the
service clubs and unions and churches and garden clubs in
town would be supported by general taxation and we would
all be excused from paying dues.... What happened to the
concept of expecting people, student or otherwise, to pay the
upkeep of their own clubs?"'
216. David Reed, Ruling May End Mandatory Activity Fees, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., Sept. 23, 1995, at B7.
217. Id.
218. See id. (noting that legal experts "believe the ruling will lead to the end of
mandatory student activities fees" and that "dozens of colleges have ... called Virginia's
student government and student affairs offices to see how the school is interpreting the
Supreme Court ruling"); Court Ruling Forces UVa to Regroup, THE DAILY TAR HEEL,
Sept. 7, 1995, at 1 (noting that the "Supreme Court's decision in [Rosenberger] has forced
universities across the nation to revaluate [sic] their own funding requirements" and that
the University of Virginia was taking "a conservative approach" to modifying its system
for that reason). Regarding the University of Virginia's conservative approach, the student
body president at the University recently said, "If we open Pandora's Box and give student
activities funds to every organization, we won't survive the onslaught .... We know other
schools are watching us, and we are being especially careful for that reason." Court Ruling
Forces UVa. to Regroup, supra, at 1. Ronald Rosenberger, Wide Awake's founder,
recently commented on UVa's conservative response to the Rosenberger decision by
labeling it a "Band-Aid solution." Prepared Testimony of Ronald W. Rosenberger Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 12, 1995), available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, FEDNEW File. Rosenberger explained that "[i]nstead of doing away with
its discriminatory prohibition against religious activities, those which 'profess or manifest
a belief in a deity or ultimate reality,' UVA simply made an exclusion for student
publications." Id.
219. See, e.g., Robert R. Detlefsen, Corrective Action or Conservative Hijacking,
RECORDER, Aug. 30, 1995, at 8 (stating that strict neutrality in distributing student fees
is the only constitutionally defensible policy).
220. Id.
221. Bill Hall, Supreme Court Not Wacked Out but the Colleges Are, THE LEWISTON
MORNING TRm., July 9, 1995, at IF.
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Other critics, however, view the potential end of the student fee
system as an "erosion of the opportunity for intellectual exploration
.... [and] an attempt to homogenize thinking at universities by
eliminating support for alternative viewpoints."'
It is difficult to say whether mandatory student fees would have
continued to thrive at universities around the country had the
Supreme Court decided Rosenberger differently. Clearly, however,
the continued vitality of the student fee system is now in peril,
especially because the system invites unlimited cries of foul play any
time an organization feels that a denial of funding is silencing its
expression. One critic has argued that Rosenberger's expression was
hardly silenced by the University.' His group "was free to
distribute its own literature, to hold meetings and to speak on
university grounds. What the university denied to Wide-Awake
magazine was the privilege of having the university use student fees
to subsidize its plainly sectarian message." 24  Perhaps that
"privilege" should be denied to all university groups. Even in the
university setting, with its thriving marketplace of ideas, the Fourth
Circuit was correct when it warned that "[t]he Speech and Press
Clause cannot be metamorphosed into a promise that the federal
government will purchase a bullhorn, paper, and ink for the con-
venience of every garrulous member of the American populace" who
wishes to have a subsidized forum, funded by taxpayers, for the
distribution of her particular ideas.P
JENNIFER LYNN DAVIS
222. Waring, supra note 155, at 628. Waring also cites the dissent in Smith v. Regents
of the University of California in which Justice Arabian observed:
We are given here the solemn opportunity [by preserving the student fee system]
of enriching the spirit of liberty by shielding all persons against the imposition of
an educational philosophy based on cynicism and divisiveness by fashioning a
decree which fosters the concept of community as opposed to constructing a wall
of separatism. This we have failed to do. We -have lost the light of wisdom and
diminished our noble heritage.
844 P.2d 500,533 (Cal.) (Arabian, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993), quoted
in Waring, supra note 155, at 630.
-223. Church and State United, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 8, 1995, at A10.
224. Id.
225. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269,277 (4th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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